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THE CONFUSION OF TRADEMARK
TERRITORIALITY
JOSEPH MICHAEL LEVY
Imagine this: company A holds a trademark in HOTEL X. These hotels
are abundant in New York City, but company A does not operate outside of
New York. Company B likes the name HOTEL X and decides to open a swath
of HOTEL Xs in San Francisco. Company A has been advertising on the
Internet for many years and explicitly targets California residents who seek
a vacation in New York.
One might expect a court to apply a traditional “likelihood of
confusion” test to determine whether there has been trademark
infringement. Yet, under current doctrine, this infringement analysis may be
rendered meaningless. At common law and under federal statutory law, oldfashioned notions of territoriality can bar a finding of infringement or
prevent an injunction, even if the court holds that confusion is likely. Thus,
in our hypothetical, the fact that company A operates only in New York could
be dispositive and ultimately stop it from enjoining company B’s use in
California.
This doctrine is outdated. Trademark law must be updated to serve its
underlying purpose: the prevention of consumer confusion. This article
proposes a simple way by which courts can accomplish this. Instead of
applying a separate test of territoriality, courts should instead use only the
infringement analysis to determine the scope of trademark rights and
remedies. This territoriality-infringement synthesis would not only simplify
the doctrine but would also serve to protect consumers who may be confused
despite a lack of geographic proximity. And these consumers are no longer
rare. Although territoriality may have once been a good proxy for predicting
whether consumers will be confused, those days are far behind us. Today,
trademarks do not have the same geographic limits due to the Internet and
a perambulating society. These changes render traditional notions of
“territory” under-protective, and until trademark doctrine accounts for the
modern world, it will be just as confused the consumers it fails to protect.
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INTRODUCTION
Trademark law is confused. At common law and under the Lanham Act,
trademark holders must deal with outdated rules about territoriality. At
common law, different owners may use similar marks as long as these marks
are used in geographically remote areas.1 Because of this, courts analyzing a
common law trademark tend to first determine whether two marks are used
in non-remote locations, and then proceed to undergo an infringement
analysis, i.e., the likelihood of confusion test. 2 If the marks are used

1. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918).
2. E.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); DeCosta v.
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 606 (1st Cir. 1992).
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remotely, then the court stops the inquiry without looking to likelihood of
confusion.
So too under the Lanham Act. Due to the Dawn Donut rule, a senior
user is unable to receive an injunction if a junior has used the mark in an area
that is remote from the senior. 3 Like the common law, this doctrine is
premised on the notion that consumers will not be confused by similar marks
used in different areas.4 However, despite its claims about confusion, this
inquiry is entirely separate from the infringement analysis. Thus, whether the
common law or Lanham Act controls, a trademark holder still must separate
the infringement analysis from the question of territoriality.
This process is unnecessarily longwinded. Under both common law and
statutory law, consumer confusion fuels trademark territoriality. As one
judge emphasized, likelihood of confusion serves as a “touchstone” when
determining the trade area. 5 As such, this paper will demonstrate that
confusion should frame the entire inquiry. There is no need to undergo a
separate territoriality analysis if a court determines that consumers are likely
to be confused. Because the whole goal of territoriality is to prevent
consumer confusion, likelihood of confusion alone should establish a prima
facie of trademark infringement sufficient to enjoin the junior user.
At first glance, this may seem like an unimportant issue. After all, what
harm is incurred by the application of excess tests, besides a bit of
inefficiency? As it turns out, trademark territoriality is not just beset with
redundancy; it actively undermines what it seeks to protect. When trademark
rights are limited to geographic areas where the owner presently operates,
then it is possible that consumers outside that area will be confused. Consider
consumers who are exposed to a mark on the Internet or consumers who are
familiar with a company’s mark in one area and travel to a remote area where
a different company uses the mark. In the modern age, fixating on geographic
proximity leaves these entire groups of consumers, Internet users, and
travelers unprotected from confusingly similar marks—and such consumers
are hardly a minority. Thus, it is a mistake to condition trademark rights on
geographic proximity. Instead, the likelihood of confusion analysis must be
the end-all-be-all. If consumers in an area are likely to be confused, then the
first to use the mark should have trademark rights in that area, whether or
not they actually operate there.

3. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).
4. See id.
5. All Video, Inc. v. Hollywood Entm’t. Corp., 929 F. Supp. 262, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
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Part I of this paper lays out the doctrinal background of territoriality and
trademark law, focusing on the similarities and differences between common
law and federal statutory law. Then, Part II sets out to show that confusion
underlies trademark territoriality both at common law and under the Lanham
Act. With this demonstrated, Part III illustrates the pitfalls of conceptualizing
territoriality as separate from the concern of confusion, specifically with
regards to the Internet and mass travel. Because of this, Part IV offers a
simple solution that merges the likelihood of confusion test with the
traditional territoriality doctrine.
I. TERRITORIALITY IN TRADEMARK LAW
A. Concurrent Use at Common Law
In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, the Supreme Court created a
seemingly simple rule: trademark rights are obtained only through use.6 In
other words, merely conceiving of a mark is insufficient to grant someone a
legal right to that mark. If one is to acquire trademark rights, she must be the
“first to use a mark on a product or service.”7 Simple enough. But, as the
Ninth Circuit has aptly noted, things get a bit more complicated “when to
time we add considerations of place.” 8 In United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus, the Supreme Court added that one must not just be the first in time
to use a mark, but she must also be the first to use the mark in a specific
place.9 The principles from Hanover Star and Theodore Rectanus form the
basis for the common law concurrent use doctrine: similar marks may be
used in remote geographic areas by good faith users, and if the area of use
overlaps, exclusive rights belong to the first user.10 Thus, for a junior user to
adopt a mark similar to that of a senior user, the junior must show that her
use is (1) remote, and (2) in good faith. For our purposes, the requirement of
good faith will be discussed later in this paper, and remoteness will be the
focus of this section.

6. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
7. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989).
8. Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004).
9. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918).
10. See id. This is also called the “Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine,” but in this paper it will exclusively
be referred to as the “concurrent use doctrine.”
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Remoteness is determined in one of two ways. First, trademark rights
are typically limited to a mark’s “zone of actual goodwill.”11 Second, even
if a mark has no actual goodwill in an area, courts have found that trademark
rights extend to a “zone of natural expansion.”12
1. Zone of Actual Goodwill
The zone of actual goodwill is divided into two categories: the mark’s
zone of market penetration and zone of reputation. 13 The zone of market
penetration is the most common indicator of actual goodwill. This zone is
equivalent to all areas where the mark holder does a sufficient amount of
business. In Sweetarts v. Sunline, the Eighth Circuit devised one of the earlier
tests to determine the scope of market.14 This test instructed courts to weigh
the following factors (1) total dollar value of plaintiff’s sales in the market;
(2) number of actual customers in relation to the region’s population; (3)
sales growth, both relative and potential; and (4) length of time since
significant sales. 15 The Third Circuit reshaped these factors in Natural
Footwear Ltd. v. Hart to create its own test for market penetration.16 This
test involves weighing the following factors (1) amount of sales involving
the trademark; (2) positive and negative growth trends in the geographical
area; (3) number of purchasing customers in relation to the total number of
potential customers; and (4) amount of advertising in the geographical area.17
Multiple other circuits have embraced the Natural Footwear factors, and
thus this test is the more common of the two.18 If a mark holder passes this
balancing test, then she is deemed to have “penetrated” the market such that
she has made actual use there.
In contrast, the zone of reputation exists in all geographical regions
where the mark is merely recognized, regardless of whether the mark holder

11. See Thomas F. Cotter, Owning What Doesn’t Exist, Where It Doesn’t Exist: Rethinking Two
Doctrines from the Common Law of Trademarks, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 487, 492 (1995).
12. Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987).
13. See id. One scholar has suggested that this distinction is artificial because both tests purport to
measure “consumer recognition.” See William J. Gross, The Territorial Scope of Trademark Rights, 44
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1075, 1110–12 (1990).
14. 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967).
15. Id.
16. Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398–99 (3d Cir. 1985).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2001);
Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 1995); Spartan, 813 F.2d at 1283.

CONFUSION OF TRADEMARK (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

THE CONFUSION OF TRADEMARK TERRITORIALITY

5/20/2019 8:52 PM

329

has made actual use there.19 An early illustration of the zone of reputation is
found in Stork Restaurant v. Sahati. 20 In Stork, the appellant owned and
operated a night club in New York called THE STORK CLUB, which had
reached nationwide fame due to widescale advertising and media presence.21
After the New York club had been in operation for sixteen years, the
appellees opened its bar in San Francisco under the name THE STORK
CLUB.22 The trial court refused to issue an injunction, but the Ninth Circuit
found that “mere geographical distance is not of itself sufficient to preclude
the possibility that a given establishment is a branch of an enterprise having
its principal place of business elsewhere.” 23 Because of this, the court of
appeals remanded the case with directions to the trial court to grant the
injunction.24 Therefore, although the two marks were used across the country
from one another, these uses were certainly not “remote” in the sense of
concurrent use under Theodore Rectanus. 25 The zone of reputation thus
aligns with the central thrust of this paper: two marks can confuse consumers
despite geographical distance.
2. Zone of Natural Expansion
As the name of this doctrine implies, some courts extend the rights of
trademark owners to areas where the use of the mark might “naturally
expand.” 26 Different courts use different factors to determine whether a
geographic territory is within this zone. A popular test devised by the Court

19. See Shontavia Johnson, Trademark Territoriality in Cyberspace: An Internet Framework for
Common-Law Trademarks, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1253, 1260 (2015) (“Where the zone of actual
market penetration is limited, the zone of reputation encompasses areas where consumers recognize the
products using the trademark but are not direct consumers of those products.”); see also W. Scott
Creasman, Establishing Geographic Rights in Trademarks Based on Internet Use, 95 TRADEMARK REP.
1016, 1018 (2005) (“The zone of reputation includes areas where consumers are aware of the seller’s
goods, but have not purchased them.”).
20. Stork Rest., Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 358 (9th Cir. 1948).
21. Id. at 350–51.
22. Id. at 351.
23. Id. at 358.
24. Id. at 364. It is important to note that this injunction would likely not be issued in the Ninth
Circuit today due to the Dawn Donut rule. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d
358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959) (“[I]f the use of the marks by the registrant and the unauthorized user are confined
to two sufficiently distinct and geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the registrant will
expand his use into defendant’s market, so that no public confusion is possible, then the registrant is not
entitled to enjoin the junior user’s use of the mark.”). For further discussion of Dawn Donut, see infra
Part I.B.2.
25. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26:17
(5th ed. 2017).
26. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989).
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of Customs and Patent Appeals (now the Federal Circuit) looks to (1)
“previous business activity;” (2) “previous expansion or lack thereof;” (3)
“dominance of contiguous areas;” (4) “presently-planned expansion;” and
(5) “possible market penetration by means of products brought in from other
areas.”27 The Eleventh Circuit looks to similar factors.28 Other courts have
foregone the multi-factor tests for a more fact-specific inquiry. 29
Nevertheless, under any analysis, most circuits tend to use a few recurring
factors: the history of expansions, the size of the business, and the amount of
business activity in the contested area. These are concrete pieces of evidence
to which the mark holder must point; she cannot simply refer to her
aspirations of expansion.30 But if a mark holder can adequately demonstrate
a zone of natural expansion, then she can acquire trademark rights before
making actual use in an area.
B. Territoriality and the Lanham Act
Territoriality also plays a misguided role under the all-encompassing
Lanham Act, which governs the federal trademark registration process. The
Lanham Act took effect on July 5, 1947. 31 In 2016, there were over two
million registered trademarks in the United States. 32 Although it is
impossible to accurately quantify the number of common law trademarks in
the United States, it is probably safe to assume that trademarks registered
27. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980). This test has been
adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuits. See Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th
Cir. 1987); see also Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398 (3d Cir. 1985).
28. Tally-Ho, 889 F.2d at 1028 (looking to (1) the geographical distance from the user’s actual
location to the perimeter of the zone of expansion; (2) the nature of the business and the size of the zone
of market penetration/reputation; (3) the history of the user’s past expansion, i.e. whether it has remained
static or has continued to expand into new areas, and based on this, the length of time it would take the
user to reach the periphery of the expansion zone; and (4) whether it would require an unusual leap for
the user to enter the zone, or instead whether the zone is close enough to existing locations that expansion
is a logical extension as those previously made).
29. The Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., 523 F.2d 424, 431 (10th Cir. 1975) (looking at the
history of expansion and business activity in the contested area); Shoppers Fair of Ark., Inc. v. Sanders
Co., 328 F.2d 496, 500–01 (8th Cir. 1964) (focusing on the location of current stores and testimony
regarding planned expansions); Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Brewer, 244 F. Supp. 293, 298–99 (W.D.
Tenn. 1965) (analyzing the “growth, size and location” of the business generally and the amount of
activity in at the contested area).
30. Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“In the instant case, [the plaintiff] produced no credible evidence that it took similar affirmative steps or
ever entertained realistic plans of expansion beyond its primary trade area.”).
31. Sondra Levine, Part One: The Common Law, the States, and Historical Perspective: The
Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22, 27 (2010).
32. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INDICATORS, at 131 (2017).
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under the Lanham Act comprise the lion’s share of trademarks in the United
States.
1. An Age of Federal Registrations
The Lanham Act grants the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) the
authority to issue concurrent use registrations to different parties so long as
the Director of the PTO determines that “confusion, mistake, or deception is
not likely to result from the continued use” by multiple parties.33 When a
concurrent registration is issued, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(“TTAB”) creates conditions and limitations regarding the mode or place of
use. 34 Registration under the Lanham Act confers upon the registrant
nationwide trademark rights based on “constructive use,” regardless of
where the registrant actually uses the mark.35 Furthermore, registration of a
mark on the principal register provides “constructive notice” of the
registrant’s ownership. 36 So, a junior user under the Lanham Act cannot
invoke the concurrent use doctrine because her use is neither remote nor in
good faith. 37 Nevertheless, a party who has used the mark before the
registration can still retain her trademark rights. 38 To do so, Section
1115(b)(5) of the Lanham Act requires a party to show that she adopted the
mark before the registration, without knowledge of the registrant’s prior use,
and that she has continuously used the mark in a specified area.39 Upon such
a showing, this prior user is “frozen” to its area of use prior to the federal
registration.
At first glance, the prior user’s ability to continue using her mark in the
face of registration seems to be a codification of the common law concurrent

33. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2016).
34. See Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Proving Ownership Online . . . And Keeping It:
The Internet’s Impact on Trademark Use and Coexistence, 104 TRADEMARK REP. 1275, 1304–05 (2014)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2014); TMEP § 1506 (5th ed. Sept. 2007); TBMP § 1101.01 (3d ed. Rev. 2,
June 2013)).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2018).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2018).
37. See MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 26:38 (“But in many situations, it will be the ‘constructive
use’ date of application that will govern and decide a territorial priority battle. [§1057(c)] constructively
puts the registrant ‘there’ as if it had actually commenced a commercial level of sales nationwide as of
the application date.”); see also Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 640 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(“By providing that registration constitutes constructive notice of the registrant’s rights, the Lanham Act
removed the good faith element in the Tea Rose-Rectanus defense.” (citing Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959))).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)(1) (2018).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (2018); see also Foxtrap, 671 F.2d at 640.
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use doctrine.40 Yet, Professor McCarthy has pointed out that there exists no
remoteness requirement in Section 1115(b)(5), unlike the concurrent use
doctrine.41 This absence has created somewhat of a circuit split. The Ninth
Circuit has held that Section 1115(b)(5) has no remoteness requirement, and
if one is to be added, that is a job for Congress.42 The Sixth Circuit, on the
other hand, has read the remoteness requirement from the common law into
the limited area defense. 43 Given this disagreement, it would be hasty to
interpret Section 1115(b)(5) as a perfect codification of the concurrent use
doctrine. Thus, for our purposes, we will treat them as distinct doctrines.
As far as remedies go, the Lanham Act confers upon the registrant the
right to a civil cause of action against an infringer44 and further entitles her
to injunctive relief. 45 However, the mere act of infringement does not
necessarily grant the registrant the right to enjoin the infringing use. The
following section will detail the territorial limits of the injunction.
2. Injunctions and the Dawn Donut Rule
In 1959, the Second Circuit created a rule that seemed to flow naturally
from the concurrent use doctrine: plaintiffs cannot enjoin remote users from
using the plaintiff’s mark.46 Starting in June of 1922, the eponymous plaintiff
in Dawn Donut adopted the mark DAWN DONUT to use in connection with
the sale of donut mix.47 Dawn Donut was a Michigan-based company that
sold its mix to buyers in several states across the country, including New
York. 48 The defendant, Hart Food Stores, owned and operated a retail
grocery chain within several New York counties.49 In 1951, Hart Food began
to use the mark DAWN in connection with the sale of baked goods within a
forty-five mile radius of Rochester, New York.50 The district court found that
Hart Food had adopted the mark in good faith and without actual knowledge

40. I have labeled this a “response” instead of a defense because there is disagreement as to whether
this is a defense on the merits or whether it simply eliminates the benefits of incontestability. See Gross,
supra note 12, at 1095–96 n.112.
41. MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 26:48.
42. Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 762 (9th Cir. 2006).
43. Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1124 (6th Cir. 1996).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)–(b) (2018).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2018).
46. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).
47. Id. at 361.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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of the plaintiff’s use.51 But because the plaintiff had federally registered its
mark in 1927, when the Lanham Act came into effect on July 5, 1947, the
defendant was held to have constructive notice of the mark.52 As such, the
defendant was unable to claim that it was engaged in good faith use. Thus, it
looked like the plaintiff had won. After all, the concurrent use defense is
inapplicable without good faith. Yet, this did not end the inquiry.
The court ultimately concluded that a senior user is not entitled to enjoin
a junior user if the two users “are confined to two sufficiently distinct and
geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the registrant will
expand his use into defendant’s market, so that no public confusion is
possible.” 53 In the case at hand, the district court found that since 1927,
Dawn Donut had not licensed its mark in connection with the sale of donuts
within sixty miles of Hart Food’s trading area.54 Furthermore, although the
plaintiff had made sales to bakers in Rochester, none of the purchasers sold
donuts in connection with the plaintiff’s mark.55 As such, the district court
concluded that Dawn Donut neither used its mark in the defendant’s trading
area nor had any intent to expand the use of its mark to the area.56 The Second
Circuit, therefore, held that Dawn Donut and the defendant used their marks
in “distinct and separate markets,” and because of this, Dawn Donut could
not enjoin the defendant’s use.57
Dawn Donut has gained popularity across circuits, and courts tend to
apply the doctrine in roughly the same way: to acquire injunctive relief, the
plaintiff must either have entered the geographical area of the defendant or
have plans to expand there.58 Unlike the concurrent use doctrine, good faith
51. Id.
52. Id. at 362 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1072 (1947)).
53. Id. at 364.
54. Id. at 361.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 364–65.
57. Id. at 365. The plaintiff was not forever foreclosed from injunctive relief, however. The court
added that Dawn Donut would be entitled to an injunction “upon a proper showing of an intent to use the
mark at the retail level in defendant’s market area . . .” Id.
58. See, e.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 931–32 (4th
Cir. 1995) (“[A] court will enjoin the junior user only if the registrant is likely to enter, or has entered,
the junior user’s trade territory.”); Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242,
1246 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[T]o enjoin a geographically remote infringer, the registered owner must prove
that its trademarked products and the infringing products are being sold in the same geographic area, or
that the owner has concrete plans to expand into the infringer’s trade area.”); Union Nat’l Bank v. Union
Nat’l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1990) (“A senior user may not exclude others in areas where he
does not currently do business nor is likely to do business in the future.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d
at 364–65)); Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[W]here a
federal registrant has expanded its business to the point that the use of the conflictingly similar marks by
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plays no role here due to constructive notice.59 After Dawn Donut, courts
tend to enjoin only based on actual use or an intent to expand. Thus, the
Dawn Donut rule only concerns the plaintiff’s zone of market penetration or
zone of natural expansion, not her zone of reputation.
II. THE ROLE OF CONFUSION
The previous section detailed the doctrinal background of trademark
territoriality, both at common law and under federal law. This is not the
whole story, however. As indicated in the introduction, there is a common
theme underlying all territoriality doctrine: confusion. As Dan Burk has
argued, a junior user’s claim of territorial rights in an area is roughly
equivalent to a claim that consumers in that area are not likely to be
confused.60 In other words, because territorial rights are entirely premised on
a lack of confusion, it is nonsensical to claim that consumers in an area are
likely to confuse a senior and junior users’ marks, and also conclude that the
senior user has no territorial rights there. But a court that rigidly applies the
zone of market penetration or expansion tests, and does not use the zone of
reputation test, could fail to issue an injunction in an area where the senior
user has a reputation without a physical presence. After all, Dawn Donut is
entirely premised on actual use or expansion.
This section will show that trademark territoriality is grounded in an
outdated notion of consumer awareness. It begins by looking at the reasoning
courts employ when drawing territorial boundaries at common law. Then, it
will look at courts’ justification for the use of Dawn Donut under the Lanham
Act. By looking at both territorial doctrines, this section will show that courts
in both areas seem to be motivated almost entirely by consumer confusion.

the registrant and the unauthorized user are no longer confined to separate and distinct market areas and
there is established the likelihood of public confusion, the federal registrant is entitled under the authority
of the Lanham Act to injunctive relief.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 365)).
59. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 362 (“[B]y eliminating the defense of good faith and lack of
knowledge, § 1072 affords nationwide protection to registered marks, regardless of the areas in which the
registrant actually uses the mark.”); see also Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (“Once registration is effected, no subsequent adoption and use of the
same or a similar mark for the same or similar goods can be justified on a claim of good faith.”).
60. Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 711
(1998) (“One might say that territorially separated concurrent users of a mark have developed rights
within distinct areas, or that the consumers in the distinct areas are unlikely to become confused, but the
statements are largely equivalent.”).
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A. Consumer Awareness at Common Law
First, return to the concurrent use doctrine. Even in Theodore Rectanus,
which created the concurrent use doctrine, the reasoning of the Court
suggests that the underlying concern was confusion. There, the Court stated
that two marks are remote if a mark “means one thing in one market, [and]
an entirely different thing in another.”61 The Court added that trademark law
prevents two non-remote entities from making use of the same mark because
of how “purchasers have come to understand the mark.” 62 The Court’s
concern is clear: an individual cannot start using a mark similar to another
mark in an area when consumers have come to understand the first mark in
a certain way. If a junior user employs a mark with which consumers have
already developed an association, then the Supreme Court would not deem
this use “remote.” This reasoning has led Professor McCarthy to remark that
remoteness at common law is not about geographical distance, but is instead
about the “territorial dimension of likelihood of confusion.”63
Even though territory is linked to confusion, the classic remoteness
doctrine tends to treat geographical distance and consumer awareness
distinctly. Think back to the zone of actual goodwill, which is divided into
two subcategories: market penetration and reputation. The former is
concerned with geographic remoteness, and the latter is concerned with
consumer awareness. If Professor McCarthy is correct (which I believe he
is), then market penetration is redundant; reputation is all that matters. But
caselaw has gone the opposite way. In practice, it is uncommon for courts to
use the zone of reputation in their territory analysis. Some courts have
recognized it,64 but many circuit courts have found that market penetration

61. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918).
62. Id.
63. MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 26:4.
64. E.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1124 (6th Cir.
1996) (“[M]ere geographical distance is not controlling where the reputation of the senior user’s mark
has been carried into a trade area prior to the junior user’s adoption and use.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 22, at § 26.06)); Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire
Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The junior user may establish his trade territory by identifying
the ‘zone of reputation’ acquired for his mark.”); Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., No. C 114991 CW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120439, at *38 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013) (recognizing that territorial
rights can stem from reputation without sales); Glow Indus. v. Lopez, 252 F. Supp. 2d 962, 983 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (“Where the trademark user has acquired a national reputation associated with its mark, it may
assert trademark rights even in areas where it has no sales.”); Laurel Capital Grp., Inc. v. BT Fin. Corp.,
45 F. Supp. 2d 469, 492 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (“Rights in a mark can extend beyond the geographic area of
actual sales and customer residences if the user’s reputation is carried via word of mouth and
advertisements.”); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar’s Palace, 490 F. Supp. 818, 827 (D.N.J. 1980)
(“[G]eographic distance between parties will not preclude a finding of infringement or unfair competition
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alone determines remoteness.65 Along these lines, some trademark scholars
have suggested that the zone of reputation should entirely give way to the
zone of penetration in determining actual goodwill, 66 or that the zone of
reputation should merely be a factor among many.67
This development would seem to suggest that Professor McCarthy and
I are wrong in claiming that remoteness is about consumer awareness and
not geography. Yet, upon closer inspection, courts commonly invoke market
penetration while simultaneously grounding their inquiry in consumer
awareness. Take, for example, the case of Accu Personnel, Inc. v. Accustaff,
Inc. from the District of Delaware.68 In Accu Personnel, the court held that
concurrent use requires geographical remoteness, and thus neither party can
penetrate the market of the other if concurrent use applies.69 This holding
was a straightforward application of the zone of market penetration, and
perhaps the analysis could have ended there. However, the court went on to
find that the trademark owner must establish market penetration sufficient to
pose a likelihood of confusion. 70 So, despite the court’s focus on actual
market penetration, it appears that the underlying concern of the court was
truly consumer confusion, not just the use in a geographical region. After all,
if the court applied remoteness in its literal geographic sense, then any

based upon a likelihood of confusion.”); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 437 F. Supp. 956, 962 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (issuing a nationwide injunction despite plaintiff’s solely local use because of nationwide
reputation); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Roberts, 388 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (D.S.C. 1974) (“Although there
is some evidence that the two restaurants do appeal to the same north-south tourist traffic, direct or market
competition is not an essential ingredient of unfair competition; and plaintiffs need not establish
competition in the same market.”).
65. See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“[E]ven though the senior user of an unregistered mark has established priority over a junior user through
prior appropriation, injunctive relief is appropriate only in those areas where the senior user can show
sufficient actual use.”); Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging,
Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (“To be entitled to injunctive relief against [the defendant’s]
subsequent good faith use, [the plaintiff] must prove that its prior use of the mark penetrated the
geographic market in question.”); GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 542 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding
that the use was remote because the plaintiff had never operated subsidiaries in the area, sold products or
provided services in the area, nor advertised in the area); Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx,
760 F.2d 1383, 1394 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he senior user of a common law mark may not be able to obtain
relief against the junior user in an area where it has no established trade, and hence no reputation and no
good will.”).
66. Gross, supra note 12, at 1086 (“[T]rademark protection should not extend beyond the area of
actual market penetration.”).
67. Brian L. Berlandi, What State Am I In?: Common Law Trademarks on the Internet, 4 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 105, 111 (1998) (“In most instances . . . the ‘Zone of Reputation’ will not
be the sole determinative factor.”).
68. 846 F. Supp. 1191, 1205–06 (D. Del. 1994).
69. Id. at 1205.
70. Id. at 1206 (citing Nat. Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1397).
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amount of market penetration would render two marks non-remote.
However, the conclusion in Accu Personnel was not that simple. Instead,
remoteness fades when consumers are sufficiently aware of both marks, or
as the Supreme Court said, the marks no longer “mean one thing in one
market” and “an entirely different thing in another.”71 Thus, although the
inquiry seemed initially to be framed around geographic penetration, the
separation between remoteness and confusion is merely illusory.
The court in Accu Personnel is not the only court to claim it is using
one test of remoteness when in fact it is using another. In National Ass’n for
Healthcare Communities v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc.,
the Eighth Circuit claimed to be focusing its remoteness inquiry on actual,
physical market penetration.72 Yet, in so doing, the court emphasized that the
market penetration “must be significant enough to pose the real likelihood of
confusion among the consumers” in the specified area.73 Moreover, when
applied to the facts at hand, the court determined that the plaintiff had not
shown a likelihood of confusion in the defendant’s area of use, and thus the
plaintiff had not penetrated that territory.74 Like the district court in Accu
Personnel, the Eighth Circuit seems to understand market penetration to both
mean penetration based on sales and penetration based on consumer
awareness. By analyzing remoteness in this way, these courts have taken a
subtle approach to ground the remoteness inquiry in confusion.
That being said, some courts explicitly define remoteness as an
assessment of consumer awareness. 75 Both the Eastern and Southern
Districts of New York are prominent examples.76 In Tuccillo v. Geisha NYC,
LLC, Judge Bianco held that a geographically remote location is defined “as

71. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918).
72. 257 F.3d 732, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2001).
73. Id. (citing Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967)).
74. Id. at 736.
75. See, e.g., Baskim Holdings, Inc. v. Two M, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01898-APG-GWF, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *9–10 (D. Nev. Sept. 25, 2017) (defining remoteness as use in an area where it
is unlikely that consumers would be confused by the second user’s use of the mark) (citing Grupo Gigante
S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2004)); Zuppardi’s Apizza, Inc. v. Tony
Zuppardi’s Apizza, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-01363 (RNC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136763, at *31 (D. Conn.
Sept. 29, 2014) (“Remoteness, under Tea-Rose Rectanus, is a question not of geographic distance but of
a mark’s strength.”); Hispanic Broad. Corp. v. Educ. Media Found., No. CV-02-7134 CAS (AJWx), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24804, at *21–22 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2003).
76. See Tuccillo v. Geisha NYC, LLC, 635 F. Supp. 2d 227, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A] senior user
cannot enjoin a junior user’s use of a mark if the junior user can prove that it . . . first used the mark in a
geographically remote location, defined as an area in which the senior user’s mark was not known such
that there would be confusion as to source . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine
Made Simple, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 60, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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an area in which the senior user’s mark was not known such that there would
be confusion as to source.” Similarly, in Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made
Simple, Inc., Judge Sweet used Theodore Rectanus to support his assertion
that remoteness is a use in “an area where the senior user’s mark was not
known such that there could be confusion as to source.”77 The Fourth Circuit
has embraced this interpretation of Theodore Rectanus and has endorsed this
notion of remoteness.78 To be sure, not all courts agree that geography and
consumer awareness are two sides of the same coin.79 Nevertheless, as these
examples show, there are notable instances of courts openly embracing the
confusion-based model of remoteness.
In sum, although some courts may be less than clear about the role of
confusion in concurrent use at common law, there are plenty of examples
that demonstrate courts generally recognize the interplay of remoteness and
confusion. Although some courts reject this overlap, this paper is making a
normative assertion, as well as a descriptive one: not only are consumer
confusion and territoriality actually intertwined, but also, the courts that
separate the two are incorrect in doing so.80
B. Confusion and Dawn Donut
This mistake is not isolated to common law marks—it is pervasive
under the Lanham Act as well. Because the Lanham Act grants mark holders
nationwide constructive use, territoriality under federal law most commonly
comes into play when courts are issuing injunctions. In other words, it is
most relevant when Dawn Donut rears its head. Because Dawn Donut
permits injunctions only when two marks are used in “distinct and separate
markets,” the doctrine seems to be concerned only with geography, not
confusion. Yet, like concurrent use at common law, this distinction is
illusory. As before, the motivation behind Dawn Donut is consumer
77. Best Cellars, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S.
90, 100 (1918)).
78. Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2003) (“A use
is geographically remote if the mark was used in an area ‘where the senior user’s mark was not known
such that there could be confusion as to source.’” (citing Best Cellars, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 84)).
79. See Diamonds Direct USA, Inc. v. BFJ Holdings, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 (E.D. Va. 2012)
(“Well-established precedent limits the geographic scope of trademark protection ‘to the locality where
the mark is used and to the area of probable expansion.’” (citing Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813
F.2d 1279, 1282 (4th Cir. 1987))); see also Laurel Capital Grp., Inc. v. BT Fin. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d
469, 482 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (“Once the court identifies a situation wherein the junior user actually possesses
superior rights in the relevant market area, the final issue is whether the ‘second comer’s’ actions cause
a likelihood of confusion.”).
80. See infra Section III.
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confusion, not geographical penetration. This motivation is readily found in
the case of Dawn Donut and in the cases that have followed.
In Dawn Donut, the court justified its decision by remarking that “no
public confusion is likely” so long as the plaintiff and defendant confined
their uses of the mark “Dawn” to separate trading areas.81 And if this was not
clear enough, the court explicitly held that when the use is confined to
distinct and separate markets, with no likelihood of expansion, “there is no
likelihood of public confusion arising from the concurrent use of the marks
and therefore the issuance of an injunction is not warranted.”82 Thus, the
court tied the denial of injunctive relief directly to the fact that there was no
likelihood of confusion. If there was a likelihood of confusion, it is doubtful
that the court would have denied the injunction. As such, this was not a case
about geography; it was a case about consumer awareness. At the time Dawn
Donut was decided, distance was often a proxy for awareness.
This is evidenced by the fact that many courts have read Dawn Donut
to be a doctrine about consumer confusion.83 At least three circuit courts
have made claims to this effect. First, while discussing the Dawn Donut rule,
the Fifth Circuit held that a user cannot not enjoin another if “the likelihood
of confusion between his product and the infringer’s is minimal or nonexistent, such as where the parties to the action use the mark in totally
different markets, or for different products.”84 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
had held that Dawn Donut requires injunctive relief to be contingent upon a

81. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).
82. Id. at 365.
83. See, e.g., Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1246 n. 7 (8th Cir.
1994); Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1963); Taza Sys., LLC v. Taza
21 Co., LLC, No. 2:11cv073, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130974, at *24–25 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2013)
(“[B]ecause these third parties use their marks in geographically ‘separate trading areas’ and there is no
evidence that Taza Systems had imminent plans to expand into the third-party user’s territory, no public
confusion [is] likely.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d 358)); Johnson v. Sosebee, 397 F. Supp. 2d 706,
709 (D.S.C. 2005) (“The right that the federal registrant obtains over common law rights is the right to
enjoin the junior user when there is a likelihood of confusion created by a likelihood of entry.” (citing
McCarthy, supra note 22, at § 26:33)); Shells Seafood Rests., Inc. v. Atari, No. 1:96cv276-C, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11157, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 4, 1997) (“Where geographic separation in use of the mark
prevents likelihood of confusion, an infringement claim will not be viable.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267
F.2d); Cent. Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., No. 1253-73, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16434, at
*14 (D.D.C. Jan. 1, 1975) (“Where there is no present likelihood that plaintiff will expand its use into
defendant’s territorial market place, as is the case here, and where the unauthorized use of a conflicting
mark is confined to a sufficiently distinct and geographically separate market by the junior user, there
may be no present likelihood of public confusion.” (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364)).
84. Union Nat’l Bank v. Union Nat’l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Golden
Flake, 312 F.2d at 626 (stating that Dawn Donut is premised “on the necessity of showing likelihood of
confusion.”).
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“present likelihood of confusion.”85 Finally, the Ninth Circuit invoked Dawn
Donut to affirm the denial of an injunction only because it found that there
was no likelihood of confusion.86 However, the court indicated that it would
not deny an injunction if the plaintiff could show a “likelihood of public
confusion,” despite the geographic distance between the two uses.87 Thus, in
all three cases, the courts applied Dawn Donut with an eye to consumer
confusion.
Of course, this might indicate that there is no issue to be resolved and
that this paper is useless. After all, if courts are conditioning injunctive relief
on confusion, then the doctrine appears to recognize the geographyconfusion overlap and thus does not need a fix. However, courts applying
Dawn Donut often forget that confusion is the underlying concern and
instead rigidly apply the geographic rule handed down when the doctrine
was created. For example, see the case of Johnson v. Sosebee.88 There, the
court did discuss confusion in the context of an injunction, but ultimately
concluded that “there is no likely confusion for a court to enjoin unless and
until the senior user shows a likelihood of entry into the junior user’s trade
territory.”89 Thus, the court refused to protect a trademark in areas that the
plaintiff had not actually penetrated, or was likely to penetrate, even if the
plaintiff had acquired a reputation in that area without a physical presence.90
Some courts do not believe that is a risk in the rigid application of Dawn
Donut because they do not think that consumer confusion is possible in
geographically distinct markets. 91 But this assumption seems unlikely,

85. Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d at 1246 (“[T]he nationwide right conferred by registration does not
entitle the owner to injunctive relief unless there is a present likelihood of confusion.” (citing Dawn
Donut, 267 F.2d at 358)); see also Comidas Exquisitos, Inc. v. O’Malley & McGee’s, Inc., 775 F.2d 260,
262 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief when the defendant used the mark in
a distinct geographic region because there was no risk of public confusion).
86. Continente v. Continente, 378 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1967).
87. See id. (“Since there is nothing in the record before us to indicate that plaintiff’s trade may
reasonably be expected to expand into the British Columbia area, and there is nothing in the record to
demonstrate the likelihood of public confusion arising from the present use, by defendant, of his mark in
British Columbia . . . plaintiff is not now entitled to any relief under the Lanham Act.”).
88. Johnson, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger,
Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 451 (4th Cir. 2004)).
90. Id. at 710–11.
91. See, e.g., Kerzner Int’l, Inc. v. Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1047 (D.
Nev. 2009) (stating that the Dawn Donut is based on a belief that no consumer confusion is possible in
geographically distinct markets, but noting that the Ninth Circuit has held otherwise in applying its
famous marks doctrine (citing Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.
2004))); Commerce Bancorp, Inc. v. BankAtlantic, 285 F. Supp. 2d 475, 501 n.12 (D.N.J. 2003) (“ . . .
there can be no likelihood of confusion until two products are marketed on the same territory.”).
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especially in light of the Internet and mass travel. Perhaps it is this
conception of Dawn Donut that has caused the Sixth Circuit to reject the
doctrine entirely and focus its inquiry solely on consumer confusion.92 In the
Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff need only show likelihood of confusion in a
particular area to enjoin the defendant’s use there, regardless of whether the
plaintiff has actually made use of the mark in that territory. 93 Concurring in
the opinion, Judge Jones argued that the mobility of modern society coupled
with the Internet has eroded geographical barriers and rendered Dawn Donut
irrelevant.94 And just a few years later, the court reiterated that when a court
is determining territorial rights, it should rely on the underlying goal of
eliminating consumer confusion. 95 Over a decade later, the First Circuit
appeared to support this view in Dorpan S.L. v. Hotel Meliá, Inc. 96 In
Dorpan, the First Circuit held that the area of a mark’s use is defined as the
area where the mark would create a likelihood of confusion, and thus an
inquiry of geographic scope and an inquiry of confusion are “one and the
same.”97
Despite these steps in the right direction, plenty of courts continue to
separate geographic from consumer awareness. The next section will discuss
the problems that arise when geographic distance is taken as an end-all-beall and is separated from a confusion inquiry.
III. WHEN CONFUSION IS FORGOTTEN
There are actual harms imposed on consumers when courts ignore the
geography-confusion synthesis: consumers are likely to be confused. At first
glance, this may seem like a circular argument. After all, it would be
fallacious to argue that confusion is vital for the sole reason that ignoring
confusion will cause confusion. But there is an important distinction that
must be made. Whether or not one accepts the premise that confusion
underlies territoriality, it is widely accepted that one of the broader goals of

92. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] court need
only find that a defendant is liable for infringement or unfair competition for it to award injunctive
relief.”).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 1057 (Jones, J., concurring).
95. Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2001).
96. Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel Meliá, Inc., 728 F.3d 55, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2013).
97. Id. (“[T]he geographic area in which an unregistered trademark is ‘in use’ is defined as the area
in which the use of similar mark would create a likelihood of confusion . . . . Thus, in this case, the inquiry
into the geographic scope of [the plaintiff’s] pre-existing common law trademark rights and the likelihood
of confusion analysis are one and the same.”).
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trademark law as a whole is to prevent consumer confusion.98 Because of
this, if a doctrine in trademark law increases the chance of confusion, then
this would seem to frustrate the very goals of trademark law itself. This
section will attempt to show that a trademark territoriality doctrine detached
from confusion will frustrate a broader purpose of trademark law.
A. The Non-Territorial Internet
The First Circuit aptly noted that it was once the case that “confusingly
similar trademarks could exist simultaneously in different geographical
areas” without risk of consumer confusion, but the Internet “has drastically
changed this situation.”99 That was in 2001, and the pace of change has not
slowed. It is now typical for a company to have its website accessible from
anywhere in the country. And in addition to having websites, companies are
on Facebook, Twitter, Yelp, Groupon, Seamless, and so on. The First Circuit
may have been concerned about individual websites, but consumer
interaction with trademarks has moved far beyond a company’s website.
Consider the case of a junior user operating a restaurant with a name
identical to a senior user’s restaurant in a geographically remote location. If
the senior mark is unregistered, and the junior use is in good faith, then
common law territoriality focusing on market penetration alone will permit
this use. In contrast, if the senior mark is registered, then a court using the
solely geographical Dawn Donut will prevent the senior user from enjoining
the junior user, assuming there is no likelihood of expansion.
Now, imagine a consumer in Portland, Oregon, who has learned about
a restaurant named “Toro Bravo” and is considering eating dinner there. This
consumer may look on Yelp and find that an identically named “Toro Bravo”
in Seattle has only a two-star rating. This rating may influence the decision
of the Portland consumer. In one study, Michael Luca has found evidence
that ratings on Yelp have a direct effect on a restaurant’s revenue. A rating
increase of one star appears to increase revenue by 5-9 percent.100 So, it is
not unreasonable to assume that restaurant ratings on Yelp do influence

98. See Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The
gravamen for any action of trademark infringement or common law unfair competition is whether the
challenged mark is likely to cause confusion.”).
99. Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2001). Although the
court was specifically referring to domain names in this case, the principle is the same. Id.
100. Michael Luca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.com 13–14 (Harv. Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 12-016, 2016), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12016_a7e4a5a2-03f9-490d-b093-8f951238dba2.pdf.
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consumer decision-making. As such, there is a chance that a low-rated
restaurant with a name identical name to the one in Portland could confuse
the consumer and alter her purchasing decisions, although one restaurant is
in a different city. 101 The Portland consumer could fail to notice that the
Seattle restaurant is a Seattle restaurant and not the one in Portland, or the
Portland consumer could assume that they have the same owner and thus the
rating of one might bear on the quality of the other. In either case, the
Portland consumer may miss out on a good meal, and the Portland restaurant
could miss out on a customer. Alternatively, in a mirrored state of affairs, the
Portland consumer may pay for a lousy meal due to her confusion on Yelp.
In the case of restaurants, courts have taken note of online uses like this
one when assessing likelihood of confusion. One court found that the
presence of two similar marks on Yelp was significant for the common
“marketing channels” prong of the likelihood of confusion analysis because
such advertising efforts were “highly probative of whether the mark creates
a likelihood of confusion.” 102 Another court looked to a restaurant’s
Facebook efforts for this analysis as well. 103 In addition to marketing
channels, one court found that mistaken restaurant Yelp reviews are
admissible evidence of actual confusion. 104 And beyond the world of
restaurants, various courts have taken note of Internet presence in multiple
ways in their confusion analysis, including advertising methods, actual
confusion, intent, and marketing channels.105 Additionally, when it comes to

101. To be sure, the mere fact that a company creates a Yelp or Facebook page does not guarantee
that consumers will create an association with the mark. But showing consumer interaction with such
pages is good evidence of such an association. See Gilson LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 31, at 1284.
102. TWTB, Inc. v. Rampick, 152 F. Supp. 3d 549, 564–65 (E.D. La. 2016) (quoting Elvis Presley
Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 197 (5th Cir. 1998)); cf. My Taco Guy, LLC v. Taco Man Corp.,
No. CV 17-1573 FMO (AJWx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212138, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2017).
103. Gorgeous Gals, LLC v. Hey Gorgeous! Spa & Wellness, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-903-RP, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 182401, at *18–19 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017).
104. You Fit, Inc. v. Pleasanton Fitness, LLC, No. 8:12-CV-1917-T-27EAJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18106, at *15–16 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2013).
105. See, e.g., Uber Promotions, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1270–71 (N.D. Fla.
2016) (evidence of similar sales/advertising methods); Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Tiger Paw Distribs.,
LLC, No. CV 416-107, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81089, at *16–18 (S.D. Ga. June 22, 2016) (evidence of
actual confusion); Teal Bay Alls., LLC v. Southbound One, Inc., No. MJG-13-2180, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10940, at *41–42 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2015) (evidence of similar advertising channels); Treemo, Inc.
v. Flipboard, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1361 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (evidence of actual confusion); Wine
& Canvas Dev. LLC v. Weisser, No. 1:11-cv-01598-TWP-DKL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113448, at *27–
28 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2014) (evidence of defendant’s intent); Nordstrom, Inc. v. Nomorerack Retail
Grp., Inc., No. C12-1853-RSM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41810, at *22 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2013)
(evidence of similar marketing channels); Lopez v. Gap, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 400, 421–22 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (evidence of lack of product proximity).
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assessing secondary meaning of a mark, courts will also use Internet
presence in various ways.106
The presence of a Yelp or a Facebook page has often played a less
prominent role when it comes to determining territorial rights. 107 For
example, take the common law territory analysis in Dudley v. HealthSource
Chiropractic, Inc., in which a court in the Western District of New York
failed to appreciate the fact that Facebook and Google searches returned
potentially confusing results.108 This fact was discussed in the Lanham Act
infringement analysis, but when it came to the common law discussion, the
court only addressed the Internet insofar as it concluded that the plaintiff
could not have exclusive rights to Internet use.109 Thus, had the plaintiff in
Dudley not registered its mark, the court could have foregone a likelihood of
confusion analysis entirely after concluding that the uses were remote. This
outcome would be unacceptable, especially because both marks were used
on the Internet.
In the similar case of Brothers of the Wheel M.C. Executive Council,
Inc. v. Mollohan, a court in the Southern District of Western Virginia limited
the scope of injunctive geographic areas actually penetrated by the plaintiff,
in supposed accordance with Dawn Donut.110 But before discussing market
penetration, the court noted that the defendant operated a Facebook page that
displayed the disputed name and logo.111 Despite this, the court ultimately
ordered that the defendant only cease use within areas physically penetrated
by the plaintiff, ignoring all Internet use. Thus, the problem with Dudley
106. Seasalt Del Mar, LP v. Five Greeks LLC, No. 16cv00601 JAH-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
186677, at *26–28 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017) (finding that an issue of fact had been raised regarding
secondary meaning due to the plaintiff’s website, Facebook page, and Yelp page); Sarkis’ Cafe, Inc. v.
Sarks in the Park, LLC, No. 12 C 9686, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22566, at *24–27 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2016)
(finding that Yelp and Grubhub reviews raise an issue of fact as to secondary meaning); Heritage of Pride,
Inc. v. Matinee N.Y. City, No. 14 Civ. 4165 (CM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86495, at *49–50 (S.D.N.Y.
June 20, 2014); GamerModz, LLC v. Golubev, No. 8:10-CV-1466-T-27TGW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116608, at *34–35 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2011) (finding that $100,000 spent on Google AdWords established
secondary meaning). But see Provident Precious Metals, LLC v. Nw. Terr. Mint, LLC, 117 F. Supp. 3d
879, 899 n.55 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (finding that such evidence is inadmissible as hearsay).
107. E.g., Gorgeous Gals, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182401, at *22–23 (discussing only geographical
distance in the remoteness analysis, although both parties had Yelp and Facebook pages); Lucky 13
Unlimited, LLC v. Comly Rd. Holdings, LLC, No. 15-5946, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6643, at *13 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 15, 2016) (discussing the existence of Yelp pages only in the context of the confusion analysis,
not territoriality); Bros. of the Wheel M.C. Exec. Council, Inc. v. Mollohan, 909 F. Supp. 2d 506, 520–
21 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (limiting the injunctions to areas where the plaintiff physically operates, despite
Facebook usage); Dudley v. HealthSource Chiropractic, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 377, 395 (W.D.N.Y. 2012).
108. 883 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
109. See id.
110. 909 F. Supp. 2d at 520–21.
111. Id. at 518.
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plagued Mollohan as well, albeit in the context of a federally registered mark.
In either case, an entire class of confused plaintiffs may potentially have been
ignored due to the restricted nature of the territoriality analysis.
This is not to say that no court considers Internet presence in its
territoriality analysis. Consider the case of Guthrie Healthcare Systems v.
ContextMedia in the Second Circuit. 112 In Guthrie, the court reviewed a
district court’s injunction and found that it was in error because the
injunction permitted the defendant to continue using its mark within
Guthrie’s service area.113 Specifically, the defendant could keep using the
mark on the Internet. The Second Circuit reasoned that because the
defendant’s webpages were accessible within the scope of the plaintiff’s
geographic territory, confusion in these areas was likely.114 Yet the court did
not determine how the injunction should be tailored to fix this problem—it
left that to the district court on remand.115 Nevertheless, the court recognized
the potential for a mark on the Internet mark to confuse, even without a
physical presence.116
In Guthrie, the court was likely influenced by the fact that the defendant
operated near the plaintiff. After all, the court found that this geographic
proximity supported a likelihood of confusion.117 However, at least one court
has found that the Internet generated a likelihood of confusion despite a lack
of geographic proximity. In Baskim Holdings, Inc. v. Two M, Inc., a court in
the District of Nevada found a genuine issue of fact as to whether businesses
in New Orleans and Las Vegas were actually remote.118 Even though the
businesses were located in different cities, the court noted the identical
names and services, coupled with the fact that both had websites and a social
media presence. 119 Although Baskim may seem unique, the holding is

112. Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27, 47 (2d Cir. 2016).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 50.
116. In this particular case, there was a physical presence, id. at 39–40, but there is no reason to read
the court’s holding as applying only to such cases. The concern was about Internet presence that could be
accessed within the plaintiff’s territory; it did not rely on the defendant physically being present as well.
Id.
117. Id.
118. No. 2:16-cv-01898-APG-GWF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *10–11 (D. Nev. Sept. 25,
2017).
119. Id. For a more subtle example of Internet presence having an effect, see Boldface Licensing +
Branding v. By Lee Tillett, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2013). There, the court refused
to apply Dawn Donut because, inter alia, the senior user had a large Internet presence and made sales
across the country. Id. I call this “more subtle” because the amount of sales in the area in question seemed
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unsurprising once one notices the court’s explicit statement that consumer
confusion is the “touchstone” of concurrent use. 120 With this axiom of
territoriality explicitly recognized, there was no reason for the court to find
that geographic proximity is necessary for confusion. After all, the internet
does not discriminate on the basis of distance. When a court fails to take this
fact into account, there is always a risk that consumer confusion will fly
under the radar.
B. A World of Travel
It bears repeating that Dawn Donut was focused on consumer
confusion, or more precisely, the lack thereof.121 As discussed above, the
Second Circuit explicitly stated that “no public confusion is possible” when
marks are used in two geographically distinct markets. 122 Of course, this
assertion no longer holds true in the age of the Internet. But the Internet is
just one of many massive societal changes that have occurred since Dawn
Donut. Also, the frequency of consumer travel has skyrocketed, completely
altering consumer exposure to geographically distant marks. In the year after
Dawn Donut was decided, airlines carried a total of 57.9 million
passengers.123 By 2017, that number had risen to 741.7 million for domestic
passengers alone—an increase of almost 1300 percent. 124 The Second
Circuit recognized this fact in Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurant,
LLC.125 In analyzing likelihood of confusion, the court stated that because
establishments like hotels and restaurants attract the traveling public, “even
businesses that are separated by large distances may attract overlapping
clientele due to the ease of travel,” and thus geographical distance does not
negate the possibility of confusion.126 Nevertheless, the court qualified this
to play a large role in the court’s holding. Id. This is unlike in Baskim where there were no sales in the
junior user’s territory. Baskim, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *10–11.
120. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *10.
121. See supra section II.B.
122. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).
123. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 885 (1999),
https://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec31.pdf.
124. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, JANUARY 2018 U.S. AIRLINE TRAFFIC DATA (2018),
https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/january-2018-us-airline-traffic-data.
125. 360 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Certain businesses such as hotels, and to a lesser degree
restaurants, attract the traveling public.”). Because the court was reviewing a preliminary injunction, it
was looking to likelihood of success on the merits and thus reviewed the mark’s distinctiveness, id. at
130–31 This is slightly different than an injunction analysis intertwined with the infringement analysis,
as was the case in Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 365. Nevertheless, the court’s comments regarding the
interplay of geography and confusion are worth discussing, Brennan’s, 360 F.3d at 134–35.
126. Id. at 135.
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claim by noting that “substantial geographic separation remains a significant
indicator that the likelihood of confusion is slight.” 127 This qualification
aligns with the interplay of confusion and territoriality. Geographic distance
might make confusion less likely, but it certainly does not negate the
possibility of confusion.
David Barrett has argued that the law should offer greater territorial
protections for marks that are associated with companies serving traveling
consumers—namely hotels and restaurants. 128 This argument aligns well
with the court’s analysis in Brennan’s: geographic distance does not dispel
confusion for perambulating consumers who travel from region to region.
Along these lines, other courts have recognized the issue of traveling
customers and have allowed the senior user to enjoin a junior user despite
geographically remote operations. In the case of Gastown, Inc. v. Gastown,
Inc., a district court in Connecticut dealt with two gas stations operating
under identical names. 129 The defendant argued Dawn Donut barred an
injunction because the closest use of the two marks was 443 miles apart.130
The court noted, however, that some major service stations, distant as they
may have been, were still placed along the same highway.131 Additionally,
the court reasoned that it was not uncommon for a motorist “to drive from
Hartford, Springfield, or Boston to Cleveland or Detroit in a single day over
interstate super-highways.”132 As such, the court concluded that there was a
likelihood of confusion and thus found that the Dawn Donut defense was
inapplicable.133
Similarly, a district court in Colorado found that the plaintiff operating
under the name “SuperShuttle” could enjoin the defendant from using the
mark SUPERSHUTTLE EXPRESS in the Denver airport, although the
plaintiff did not operate there.134 First, the court did find that the plaintiff had

127. Id. (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364).
128. David S. Barrett, The Future of the Concurrent Use of Trademarks Doctrine in the Information
Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 687, 700–03 (2000). For a nice example of a court recognizing
this aspect of hotels, see Tisch Hotels v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965) (finding
that traveling customers may confuse the senior user’s hotel mark with the junior user’s hotel mark,
despite operating in geographically distant locations).
129. Gastown, Inc. v. Gastown, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D. Conn. 1971).
130. Id. at 629.
131. Id. at 630.
132. Id. at 632.
133. Id. at 632–33.
134. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer-Schonewill & Assocs., No. 95-D-2272, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21260, at *9–10 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 1995).
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shown that Denver was within its zone of natural expansion.135 However,
even if the plaintiff had not demonstrated this, the court was aware that “both
parties provide services primarily to individuals traveling from one airport
to another,” and thus, the plaintiff would be unlikely to distinguish between
the two uses, despite such uses being in “remote geographic regions.”136
On the other hand, some courts are less inclined to worry about
traveling customers. The Fifth Circuit has held that “[c]oncurrent ownership
of marks in separate geographical territories is clearly permissible” because
the fact that “an occasional purchaser will travel between geographical
districts is not a large enough problem to justify outlawing concurrent
trademark ownership.”137 And the Third Circuit has not done much better. In
the case of Holiday Inns of America v. B & B Corp., the owner of HOLIDAY
INN hotels sought to enjoin defendant’s use of HOLIDAY INN on its hotels
in the Virgin Islands.138 The court initially seemed to be inclined to grant the
traveling customer more protection by noting that “the development of
today’s mobile society” has frustrated older trademark concepts regarding
restricted or local markets.139 Nevertheless, the court denied the injunction
until the plaintiff could show that it had actually entered the defendant’s
territory.140 The court made this ruling despite also determining that the case
involved an industry frequented by perambulating consumers and that there
would almost certainly be confusion when the plaintiff entered the
defendant’s territory. 141 Thus, because the court remained fixated on
geographic territory, it permitted the confusion that may befall the traveling
consumer.
Holiday Inns perfectly demonstrates how concurrent use can go awry
when courts fail to consider mobility. The court was entirely focused on the
fact that Holiday Inns did not have a location in one specific area, despite
135. Id. at *9.
136. Id. at *9–10.
137. Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387–88 (5th Cir. 1977).
This quote was in regard to forfeiture due to unrestrained licensing, but the court made the claim to justify
concurrent uses, and so it is nonetheless very relevant for our analysis, id.
138. Holiday Inns of Am. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 615 (3d Cir. 1969).
139. Id. at 617. Note that this case was decided in 1969, before communication became instantaneous
with the advent of the Internet, and at a time of far less travel. Even so, its rule has been followed in more
recent cases. See, e.g., Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc. v. Arkay Donuts, LLC, No. 05-387 (JWB), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43522, at *15 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2005) (quoting Holiday Inns for the proposition that “injunctive
force may be unleashed only against conditions generating a presently existing actual threat.”); Cohen’s
Fashion Optical, Inc. v. Cohen, No. 94-297, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22494, at *12–15 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
30, 1996) (applying the holding from Holiday Inns as a variant of Dawn Donut in the Third Circuit).
140. Holiday Inns, 409 F.2d at 618.
141. Id.
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otherwise being a national chain with national advertising campaigns. 142
This fact alone might suggest that concurrent uses should not be allowed.
Yet, most importantly, the case involved the hotel industry, whose very
essence is tied to the traveling consumer. If concurrent uses are supposed to
be permitted only when there is no likelihood of consumer confusion, then
this is undermined when a court ignores the nature of the industry and the
possibility of mobile consumers. Drawing these arbitrary borders will often
frustrate the purpose of shielding consumers from confusion.
IV. THE UNIFYING POWER OF CONFUSION
As the previous section demonstrated, current territoriality doctrine
struggles to account for societal advancements over the past few decades.
Both concurrent use for common law marks and the Dawn Donut for
registered marks fail to adequately protect consumers from possible
confusion. But trademark law does not need an entire reformation. Instead,
the territoriality issue can be entirely captured by the likelihood of confusion
analysis. As discussed earlier, the remoteness inquiry at its core is meant to
track consumer awareness. Because of this, there is no reason for a court to
determine territorial rights and then move onto a separate infringement
discussion. Consumer awareness, and thus remoteness, will be entirely
captured by the infringement analysis.
This proposal immediately raises two potential technical issues to
address before proceeding. First, one might be concerned that this synthesis
would change the evidence required to demonstrate likelihood of confusion.
However, no evidentiary overhaul is needed, because it is a factual issue to
both determine a trademark’s territory 143 and to evaluate likelihood of
confusion. 144 Thus, any factual evidence that was once required to
demonstrate territory will merely be shifted to the infringement inquiry.
142. Id. at 615, 617.
143. See Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995)
(“[F]inding the territorial scope of trademark rights has been a question of fact.”); Hispanic Broad. Corp.
v. Educ. Media Found., No. CV-02-7134 CAS (AJWx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24804, at *22 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 30, 2003) (“[F]or the same reasons that the likelihood of confusion analysis turns on disputed factual
issues, the issue of whether [defendant’s] first use was in a ‘“remote area’” cannot be decided on a motion
for summary judgment.”); Popular Bank v. Banco Popular, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(“The actual geographic area a party carves out is a question of fact.”).
144. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1024 (3d Cir. 2008) (“ . . . likelihood of
confusion is a question of fact.”); Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 328 (5th Cir.
2008) (“Likelihood of confusion is a question of fact reviewed for clear error.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, courts are still willing to grant summary judgment on issues of confusion. See
Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Likelihood of confusion is
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Second, one might worry about laches. If a trademark holder can
acquire territorial rights in an area without using her mark there, then it is
possible that the mark holder may not know the territorial extent of her rights.
So, it may be possible that her rights are infringed in a particular area without
her knowledge, and if she waits too long to sue due to this lack of knowledge,
the doctrine of laches might bar her suit. However, the Fourth Circuit’s
conception of laches obviates this concern by placing no obligation to sue on
a mark holder until the “likelihood of confusion looms large.”145 Thus, the
plaintiff is barred only if she has “unreasonably delayed” her pursuit of a
remedy.146 As such, it is doubtful that a court will consider a plaintiff to have
unreasonably delayed its pursuit of a remedy if she was unaware that she had
such a right. Only when she becomes aware of her rights in an area will the
laches clock begin to run.
With these technical issues resolved, the following sections will detail
how the likelihood of confusion analysis nearly encompasses trademark.
First, the paper will turn to the common law doctrine to see how this
incorporation plays out. Then, with this backdrop, the paper will move to
federal law, advocating for the abolition of Dawn Donut in a world of
synthesized territoriality and confusion.
A. The Common Law Solution
Because federal registration is the prevalent norm, one might wonder
what role common law marks still play in trademark law. As it turns out,
common law marks still play an important role. Although many businesses
do register their marks, there are specific industries that frequently do not
resort to federal registration. The restaurant industry is one such group. This
fact is particularly important for our purposes because restaurants often have
an internet presence (due to services like Yelp and Seamless) and are
common destinations for travelers.
Common law marks are still prevalent in the restaurant industry. To
demonstrate this, the names of restaurants from four major U.S. were
searched using the Trademark Electronic Search System to determine which

a question of fact, but the court may grant summary judgment in appropriate circumstances.”); see also
Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 775 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although likelihood of confusion is a
question of fact, it may be decided as a matter of law.”).
145. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing MCCARTHY,
supra note 22, at § 31.06(2)(c)).
146. Id.
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restaurants had not registered their marks. 147 In every city, a minority of
restaurants had registered their marks. In Portland, Oregon, 29 of 38
restaurant marks were unregistered.148 Likewise, in Seattle, Washington, 29
of 38 marks were unregistered.149 In Austin, Texas, 29 of 38 marks were
unregistered.150 Even in a city like New York, New York, 25 of 38 marks
were unregistered.151 Thus, just about three-quarters of listed restaurants in
all four cities had not registered their marks. 152 To be sure, this analysis is
not a rigorous empirical study, but the numbers nonetheless seem to suggest

147. The list of restaurants were obtained through the “38 Essential Restaurants” lists for each city
put out in January 2018 by Eater, a food blog. See Mattie John Bamman & Eater Staff, The 38 Essential
Portland Restaurants, Winter 2018, EATER (Jan. 9, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://pdx.eater.com/maps/38best-portland-oregon-restaurants [https://perma.cc/7TX9-YSH7]; Eater Staff, The 38 Essential Seattle
Restaurants, Winter 2018, EATER (Jan. 9, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://seattle.eater.com/maps/best-seattlerestaurants-38 [https://web.archive.org/web20180117212844/http://seattle.eater.com/maps/best-seattlerestaurants-38]; Nadia Chaudhury, The 38 Essential Austin Restaurants, Winter 2018, EATER (Jan. 9,
2018,
1:17
PM),
https://austin.eater.com/maps/best-restaurants-austin-eater-38-map
[https://web.archive.org/web20180109210345/http://austin.eater.com/maps/best-restaurants-austineater-38-map]; Eater Staff, The 38 Essential Restaurants in New York City, Winter 2018, EATER (Jan. 9,
2018,
1:43
PM),
https://ny.eater.com/maps/best-new-york-restaurants-38-map
[https://web.archive.org/web20180203083717/http://ny.eater.com/maps/best-new-york-restaurants-38map].
148. The unregistered marks were: ATAULA, RESTAURANT ST. JACK, KEN’S ARTISAN
BAKERY, MI MERO MOLE, MÅURICE, IMPERIAL, DEPARTURE, HIGGINS RESTAURANT
AND BAR, DUCK HOUSE CHINESE RESTAURANT, OLYMPIA PROVISIONS SE, HOLDFAST
DINING, BIWA KITCHEN, FARM SPIRIT, CASTAGNA, BOLLYWOOD THEATER, AVA
GENE’S, HAN OAK, TUSK, LANGBAAN, LAURELHURST MARKWT, APIZZA SCHOLLS, ROSE
VL DELI, COQUINE, TORO BRAVO, MILK GLASS MARKET, PODNAH’S PIT BBQ, BEAST,
MAE, and PIP’S ORIGINAL.
149. The unregistered marks were HITCHOCK RESTAURANT, FLINTCREEK CATTLE CO.,
CAFÉ MUNIR, WATARU, KEDAI MAKAN, JUNEBABY, THE WANDERING GOOSE, TARSAN I
JANE, WESTWARD, JOULE, WINDY CITY PIE, LI’L WOODY’S, STATESIDE, SPINASSE,
BATEAU, LARK, NO ANCHOR, LE PICHET, SUSHI KASHIBA, MATT’S IN THE MARKET,
NIRMAL’S, THE LONDON PLANE, TSUKUSHINBO, HUONG BINH, BAR DEL CORSO,
MARINATION MA KAI, MASHIKO, TAQUERIA LA FONDITA, and NOODLE BOAT THAI
RESTAURANT.
150. The unregistered marks were L’OCA D’ORO, SALT & TIME, EMMER & RYE, EPICERIE,
KOMÉ, DAI DUE, OLAMAIE, VIA 313, APIS, DIN HO CHINESE BBQ, BIDERMAN’S DELI,
CONTIGO, EASTSIDE CAFÉ, JEFFREY’S, OLAMAIE, MICKLETHWAIT CRAFT MEATS,
BUENOS AIRES CAFE, TAMALE HOUSE EAST, EL NARANJO, VERACRUZ ALL NATURAL,
DEE DEE, JUSTINE’S BRASSERIE, LAUNDERETTE, LENOIR, BOULDIN CREEK CAFÉ, EL
PRIMO, SICHUAN RIVER, TASTE OF ETHIOPIA, and VALENTINA’S TEX MEX BBQ.
151. Those marks were SPICY VILLAGE, FLAMING KITCHEN, LE COUCOU, WILDAIR,
UNCLE BOONS, PRUNE, I SODI, OIJI, HANOI HOUSE, SHUKO, ALDEA, COTE KOREAN
STEAKHOUSE, THE GRILL, INDIAN ACCENT, BOULUD SUD, FLORA BAR, CHARLES
COUNTY PAN FRIED, DUMPLING GALAXY, LILIA, PETER LUGER STEAK HOUSE, MARLOW
& SONS, ROBERT’S, LA VARA, OLMSTED, EL ATORADERO, HOMETOWN BAR-B-QUE.
152. It is important to note that some of these unregistered marks may be unregistered not due to a
lack of desire to do so, but simply because the mark cannot be registered for some other reason, such as
lack of distinctiveness.
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that it is not uncommon for a restaurant to forego registering its mark. As
such, common law marks continue to play a role in trademark law.
This focus on restaurants may lead one to conclude that the concurrent
use doctrine at common law does not need total reformation. Instead, perhaps
restaurants could have a unique territoriality doctrine. But this would be
misguided. The problems identified in previous sections are not unique to
restaurants. After all, restaurants are not the only industries that have
perambulating customers. Should the occasional gas station or hotel that
utilizes a common law mark use this special territoriality doctrine? And
although federal registration is standard, it is incredibly likely that Internet
users will encounter common law marks while online.
For the sake of parsimony, and to avoid creating an under-inclusive test,
territoriality should be applied uniformly for all types of marks. This means
that the common law concurrent use doctrine must be reformed to account
for the Internet and mass travel. In what follows, the paper argues that this
reform does not require any new tests. Instead, the territoriality analysis
should be entirely subsumed by the likelihood of confusion test. Both
remoteness (zone of goodwill and natural expansion) and good faith can be
wholly captured by the factors in the likelihood of confusion test.
1. Remoteness
a. Zone of Actual Goodwill
Recall that the remoteness inquiry at common law focuses on the zone
of actual goodwill, which is divided into two subclasses: market penetration
and reputation. As discussed before, the zone of market penetration has four
commonly-used factors (1) amount of sales involving the trademark; (2)
positive and negative growth trends in the geographical area; (3) the number
of purchasing customers in relation to the total number of potential
customers; and (4) amount of advertising in the geographical area.153 The
major flaw with this test is that it is unequipped to deal with confusion caused
by the Internet and perambulating customers. The zone of reputation, on the
other hand, is well-suited for these phenomena because it does not arbitrarily
draw lines based on geography. Instead, the zone of reputation is meant to
align entirely with areas where a sufficient number of consumers recognize
the mark. That is, it attempts to locate the areas where consumers may be
153. Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398–99 (3d Cir. 1985). The
Natural Footwear factors have been endorsed by multiple other circuits. See, e.g., Allard Enters. v.
Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2001); Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d
984, 989 (9th Cir. 1995); Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987).
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confused, not just those areas where the mark is used. Thus, the zone of
reputation is crucial for adequately evaluating confusion.
Initially, it may seem difficult to determine the extent of a reputational
zone without reference to actual sales. As such, courts have attempted to set
out concrete factors to determine the scope of such a zone. For example, the
Southern District of Florida set out a few valuable factors in Popular Bank
v. Banco Popular.154 The case involved two banks. One operated entirely in
Miami, Florida, and the other began operations in Puerto Rico, eventually
spreading its advertisements and operations to several parts of Florida,
including Miami. 155 Banco Popular argued that it had territorial rights in
Southern Florida—even in places where it did not have banks—due to its
reputation in the area. To analyze this, the court devised three factors for
determining whether reputation without sales could establish trademark
rights in an area, looking at the amount of (1) advertising in the area, (2)
goods bearing the mark that are transported into the territory, and (3)
customers in the territory that visit the business. 156 These factors make
intuitive sense, and they attempt to address at least one problem with
territoriality, namely the perambulating customer.
Yet, courts have yet to flesh-out an adequate test for dealing with the
Internet, either under the zone of reputation or penetration. W. Scott
Creasman has suggested that courts ought to merge both penetration and
reputation into a five-factor test when analyzing Internet marks (1) volume
of internet sales, (2) growth trends, (3) sales as a function of the total market,
(4) distribution of sales points, and (5) specific targeting, including brickand-mortar advertising.157 However, as Shontavia Johnson has pointed out,
Creasman does not consider the number of visitors to the mark holder’s
websites nor the amount of money spent on Internet marketing tools.158 Thus,
in response, Johnson has proposed a test that asks a single underlying
question: has there been trademark use or penetration sufficient to create a
lasting impression in the consumer’s mind in the relevant geographical
region? 159 To determine this, Johnson suggests applying Creasman’s five
factors, coupled with four more (6) type and amount of Internet advertising,

154. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1355 (S.D Fla. 1998).
155. Id. at 1351–52.
156. Id. at 1355. Although the court was open to granting rights on the basis of reputation, it found
that the Puerto Rican bank had failed to establish a zone of reputation, id.
157. Creasman, supra note 19, at 1032–33.
158. Johnson, supra note 19, at 1288.
159. Id. at 1289–90.
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(7) length and manner of presence on the Internet, (8) the purpose and
character of the internet presence, and (9) the number of unique monthly
Internet visitors.160
The creation of a new multi-factor test for territoriality on the Internet
is entirely unnecessary. Johnson defends the use of this seemingly unwieldy
nine-factor test by pointing out that trademark law has plenty of multi-factor
tests, such as the eight-plus factor infringement test.161 Fair enough. But I
propose an even simpler solution: forget all these tests for territoriality and
simply use the multi-factor infringement test. In analyzing infringement,
courts commonly look to several factors (1) the similarity of the marks, (2)
defendant’s intent, (3) actual confusion, (4) proximity of the goods (i.e., the
similarity of the goods/services), (5) strength of the plaintiff’s mark, (6)
consumer sophistication, (7) likelihood of bridging the gap (how likely the
plaintiff is to enter the defendant’s market), and (8) comparative quality of
the goods. 162 Different circuits take different approaches to consumer
confusion, but all utilize factors similar to the these.163 One additional prong
considered by multiple other circuits is especially vital to our analysis (9)
similarity of advertising methods164 or marketing channels.165
Three of these infringement factors align with the zones of penetration
or reputation: marketing channels, advertising channels, and evidence of
actual confusion. Together, these three factors look to where the product is
sold, advertised, and recognized by consumers. These elements sufficiently
capture the thrust of both the zones of penetration and reputation, even if
some aspects of the territoriality tests left behind. For example, the likelihood
of confusion test does not compare the number of sales to the size of the
market, as is done in the penetration analysis. Nor does it weigh the number

160. Id. at 1290.
161. Id. at 1291.
162. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
163. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 606 (1st Cir. 1992) (analyzing trading
channels and relation of advertising instead of comparative quality and likelihood of bridging the gap);
Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying the Polaroid factors);
Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying the
Polaroid factors); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 1986) (utilizing
four factors: similarity of marks, the defendant’s intent, proximity of the goods, and consumer
sophistication); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (looking also to the price
of the goods and the length of time the defendant has used the mark); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big
Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982) (looking to “marketing channels used” as
opposed to comparative quality); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979)
(looking to “marketing channels used” instead of comparative quality).
164. See DeCosta, 981 F.2d at 606; Interpace, 721 F.2d at 463.
165. See Frisch’s’, 670 F.2d at 648; AMF, Inc., 599 F.2d at 348–49.
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of monthly visitors to a website, which Johnson proposed for her Internet
test. But if avoiding confusion is the end-goal of trademark law, then these
factors are unnecessary. Consider this: if mark P and mark Q look entirely
different, are sold in entirely different markets, and are advertised through
entirely different marketing channels, what is the purpose of determining
what percentage of a specific territory buys P in relation to the territory’s
total population? In the end, if there is no likelihood of confusion, then the
number of sales is meaningless because P and Q can coexist.166 Thus, the
zones of penetration and reputation do not require any extensive territorial
inquiries that are not already covered by the likelihood of confusion analysis.
b. Zone of Natural Expansion
The zones of penetration and reputation may be accounted for, but the
infringement analysis must also account for the zone of natural expansion to
satisfy remoteness. Recall that there are multiple tests for expansion, but a
common one embraced by multiple circuits looks to (1) the mark holder’s
previous business activity, (2) any previous expansions or lack thereof, (3)
contiguousness of expansion areas, (4) presently-planned expansions, and
(5) whether products are brought into the supposed expansion area from
other regions.167 The zone of natural expansion differs from penetration and
reputation in that it does not attempt to identify present confusion, but instead
future confusion. Initially, then, it may seem as though the likelihood of
confusion test cannot capture the purpose of natural expansion. Luckily, the
infringement analysis set out in Polaroid can deal with this issue in its
“bridging the gap” factor.
Bridging the gap refers to a situation where the “senior user presently
intends to expand his sales efforts to compete directly with the junior
user.”168 The Southern District of New York has indicated that it protects the
senior user’s interest in “preserving avenues of expansion and entering into
related fields.” 169 In the past, courts seemed to be less concerned with
geographic distance, and more concerned about “competitive distance” when
it comes to likelihood of bridging the gap. 170 This focus on competitive
166. Of course, this assumes that neither is liable for any other trademark claim, such as dilution.
167. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980). See also Spartan
Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987); Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner &
Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398 (3d Cir. 1985).
168. Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Tech., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
169. E.S. Originals, Inc. v. Stride Rite Corp., 656 F. Supp. 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
170. See, e.g., The Deal v. Korangy Publ’g, 309 F. Supp. 2d 512, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); New Colt
Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 226 (D. Conn. 2004).
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distance would deal with concerns about consumer confusion. If a mark is
not competitively proximate to another mark, either by market or geography,
then two consumers are not likely to be confused. However, if a mark may
soon become competitive with another mark, then this is something that must
be taken into account. The “bridging the gap” factor deals with this issue by
looking to whether two marks will become competitively proximate.
To be sure, “bridging the gap” most commonly refers to market
distance, not geographic reach, unlike the zone of natural expansion.
However, as discussed above, geography is merely a proxy for consumer
awareness. As long as bridging the gap captures a likelihood of future
confusion, then it has served the underlying purpose of territoriality.
If one believes that territorial expansion ought to be accounted for, then
courts need to only slightly alter the factor to align with the Second Circuit.
In the Second Circuit, “bridging the gap” becomes important when the junior
user shows that the senior operates in either “a different field of enterprise or
a different geographic area.” 171 By framing the inquiry in this way, the
Second Circuit has explicitly recognized that “bridging the gap” can be used
to look at future market expansion or geographic expansion. Although this
conception of “bridging the gap” may not yet be embraced by every circuit,
it has the potential to capture the purpose of the zone of natural expansion.
If other courts adopt a conception of “bridging the gap” that includes future
expansions to a geographic area, then the zone of natural expansion can be
completely captured by this factor of the infringement test. But even if courts
do not shift their conception of “bridging the gap,” then the zone of natural
expansion is still tested by an analysis of future market moves. This inquiry
tests potential consumer awareness, which is the motivating force behind the
zone of natural expansion.
2. Good Faith
For the infringement analysis to completely supplant common law
territoriality, it must also account for the good faith prong, i.e., the second
requirement of concurrent use.172 Like above, this requirement is completely
captured by the likelihood of confusion analysis—this time by the
“defendant’s intent” factor. Courts have held that this factor of the confusion
analysis looks to the defendant’s “intent to confuse or deceive consumers as

171. Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27, 45 (2d Cir. 2016).
172. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918).
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to the product’s source”173 or to the defendant’s intent to capitalize on the
plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill.174
The good faith requirement of territoriality varies across jurisdictions.
Multiple circuits have taken the requirement of good faith to mean that the
junior user must not have any knowledge of the senior user’s mark.175 This
understanding seems to suggest that in such jurisdictions, a junior user
jeopardizes her good faith by merely doing a Google search of a mark before
its adoption.176 In contrast, other courts have held that mere knowledge is
insufficient to destroy good faith. 177 For example, the Tenth Circuit has
emphasized that although a junior user’s subsequent adoption of a mark with
knowledge of the senior user’s mark “can certainly support an inference of
bad faith, mere knowledge should not foreclose further inquiry.”178 Instead,
good faith hinges on “whether the second user had the intent to benefit from
the reputation or goodwill of the first user.”179 This approach more closely
resembles the intent inquiry within the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Although some circuits hold that intent to copy is sufficient to infer
likelihood of confusion in the infringement analysis, 180 an overwhelming
majority of circuits do not think that a defendant’s knowledge alone is

173. Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (italics omitted).
174. W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 808 F. Supp. 1013, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
175. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 437 (9th Cir. 2017) (“.
. .there is no good faith if the junior user had knowledge of the senior user’s prior use.”); Nat’l Ass’n for
Healthcare Commc’ns Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001)
(finding that the use was “in good faith, without knowledge of [the senior user’s] prior use”); Money
Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1982) (“A good faith junior user is one who
begins using a mark with no knowledge that someone else is already using it.”).
176. See MNI Mgmt., Inc. v. Wine King, LLC, 542 F. Supp. 2d 389, 412–13 (D.N.J. 2008)
(discussing how good faith could have been destroyed had the defendant done a Google search and found
plaintiff’s mark, but ultimately finding that there was no evidence that the defendant had knowledge of
the mark).
177. C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001) (“. . . knowledge of use
is but one factor in a good faith inquiry”); DeCosta v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 611–12 (1st Cir.
1992) (finding that bad faith is an intent or expectation to cause confusion); Members First Fed. Credit
Union v. Members 1st Fed. Credit Union, 54 F. Supp. 2d 393, 409 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that the
concurrent use defense would be unavailable due to the junior user’s knowledge of the senior’s mark);
Accu Pers., Inc. v. AccuStaff, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1191, 1211 (D. Del. 1994) (“. . . a junior user’s prior
knowledge of a senior user’s trademark use is probative of, but not dispositive of, the question whether
the junior user acted in bad faith.”).
178. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 998 (1990).
179. Id.
180. E.g., Streamline Prod. Sys. v. Streamline Mfg., 851 F.3d 440, 455 (5th Cir. 2017) (“. . . a
defendant’s intent to confuse may alone be sufficient to justify an inference that there is likelihood of
confusion.”) (citation omitted); Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1157 (10th Cir.
2013) (“. . . evidence of intent to copy may justify an inference of likelihood of confusion.”).
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sufficient for such an inference. 181 Thus, because confusion underlies
territoriality, the courts that currently apply a knowledge standard for good
faith in the territoriality analysis are misguided. After all, in the actual
confusion analysis, a majority of courts do not accept that knowledge entails
confusion. And this makes sense. The mere fact that the junior user knew of
the senior user’s mark says nothing about consumer confusion.
In response, proponents of the knowledge standard assert that confusion
can be presumed if the junior user knew of the senior user’s mark.182 But as
Thomas Cotter has pointed out, there seems to be little reason to accept this
claim without evidence that the junior user’s knowledge bears a meaningful
correlation to consumer knowledge.183 This is because the intent factor is
ultimately grounded in the likelihood of consumer confusion, like the rest of
infringement analysis.184 To this end, the Third Circuit has even held that an
explicit intent to copy is not alone sufficient to infer confusion.185 Confusion
can only be inferred if the intent to confuse is “demonstrated via purposeful
manipulation of the junior mark to resemble the senior’s.”186
Because knowledge does not entail confusion, and because the
touchstone of territoriality is consumer awareness, then mere knowledge
should not bar a finding good faith for concurrent use. This means that the
likelihood of confusion analysis will completely capture the good faith
requirement of concurrent use, even in those jurisdictions that adopt a
knowledge standard for good faith. Such jurisdictions have become
disconnected from the purpose of the doctrine: to protect consumers from
181. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. IJR Capital Invs., L.L.C., 891 F.3d 178, 196 (5th Cir. 2018)
(holding that “mere awareness” does not establish bad intent); Progressive Distrib. Servs. v. UPS, Inc.,
856 F.3d 416, 436 (6th Cir. 2017) (“However, knowledge of a trademark, alone, will not support a finding
of intent to confuse . . .”); Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1159 (claiming that knowledge of the senior’s mark
may not be the intent relevant for the confusion analysis); Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor
Co., 613 F.3d 754, 767 (8th Cir. 2010) (“. . . knowledge did not equate with an intent to mislead.”);
Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 75 (1st Cit. 2008) (distinguishing between bad faith and
willfulness, the latter of which requires knowledge alone); Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628,
644–45 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that knowledge is not sufficient to demonstrate fraudulent intent); A&H
Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2000); Sports Auth.,
Inc. v. Prime Hosp. Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that knowledge does not necessarily
give rise to an inference of bad). But see Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426,
434 (9th Cir. 2017) (“. . . choosing a designation with knowledge that it is another’s trademark permits a
presumption of intent to deceive.”).
182. See David S. Welkowitz, The Problem of Concurrent Use of Trademarks: An Old/New
Proposal, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 315, 332 (“The most forceful justification for this principle is that name
confusion can be presumed from the fact of the junior user’s knowledge—if the junior user knows of the
other use, so must other people.”).
183. Cotter, supra note 11, at 535–36.
184. A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 225.
185. Id. at 225–26.
186. Id.
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confusion. Because the intent factor in the infringement analysis concerns
itself with consumer confusion, that factor is wholly sufficient to capture the
good faith requirement of Theodore Rectanus.
In sum, both the remoteness and good faith prong of concurrent use can
be captured by the likelihood of confusion analysis. Thus, applying a
separate test for common law territoriality is entirely unnecessary, and such
tests should be discarded. That is not the end of the argument, however. The
final section shows that territorial limitations under federal law must be
discarded as well.
B. Farewell, Dawn Donut
In a regime of nationwide constructive use, a trademark holder’s
territorial rights are not segmented as they would be common law since her
territorial rights become national upon registration. Nevertheless, as the
reader will recall, territorial barriers are not entirely absent with federallyregistered marks. The doctrine of Dawn Donut can prevent injunctive relief
notwithstanding the senior’s national rights, thus causing the same pitfalls
that are present in the common law territoriality doctrine. Internet users and
perambulating customers do not cease to exist once a mark has been
registered federally. Because of this, it is crucial that courts determine the
scope of injunctions in reference to consumer confusion and do not adopt a
misguided requirement of physical presence. In other words, courts must
condition injunctions on consumer confusion, not territorial proximity, thus
eliminating Dawn Donut.
The decision to discard Dawn Donut is not novel. As mentioned in the
introductory section on Dawn Donut, the Sixth Circuit has altogether
rejected the doctrine. There, courts begin their inquiry by determining
whether there is a likelihood of confusion at all.187 If infringement is found,
and there are no applicable defenses, then an injunction is permitted without
any territorial inquiry because “no particular finding of likelihood of entry”
is required for an injunction.188 Thus, by rejecting Dawn Donut, the Sixth
Circuit blends the likelihood of confusion analysis with that of territoriality:
if the junior’s use has created a likelihood of confusion in a particular area,

187. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 380–81 (6th Cir. 2006).
188. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1999).
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then the senior user may obtain injunctive relief in that area, and thus has
territorial rights there.189
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Carmax, Judge Jones wrote in a
concurrence that Dawn Donut does not override the confusion inquiry
because the likelihood of entry into a market is but one factor in the
analysis.190 The Middle District of Pennsylvania took this same approach in
Members First Federal Credit Union v. Members 1st Fed. Credit Union,
when the court refused to “supplant” the ten-factor likelihood of confusion
test with Dawn Donut.191 The court in Members First was right to use the
word “supplant.” By applying Dawn Donut, courts override any
determination of confusion just because of geographical distance, thereby
supplanting the entire confusion inquiry. Perhaps this was appropriate when
confusion was unlikely due to distance, but as has been shown, this can no
longer be presumed in light of the Internet and mass travel.
It seems that the Second Circuit—the court that originally devised the
Dawn Donut rule—has partially rethought its stance on territoriality as well.
Return to the case of Guthrie discussed earlier for its take on the Internet.192
The plaintiff, Guthrie, owned and operated various medical facilities and
specialized healthcare facilities, primarily within Northern Pennsylvania and
Southern New York (deemed Guthrie’s “service area”).193 The defendant,
ContextMedia, delivered health-related content to physician practices in all
fifty states. 194 The district court held that ContextMedia’s mark was
confusingly similar to Guthrie’s, and enjoined ContextMedia’s use in
Guthrie’s service area.195 But no injunction issued for locations outside of
Guthrie’s service area because the court found that there was no likelihood
of confusion, although Guthrie maintained patient treatment facilities in two
New York counties beyond its service area.196 The Second Circuit reversed,
holding that a senior user who has shown that she is entitled to an injunction
189. See id. (“The Sixth Circuit has an eight point test for infringement liability under the Lanham
Act . . . [l]ikelihood of entry is just one of the eight factors under this test, and it is not dispositive of
liability.”) (internal citations omitted).
190. Id. at 1057 (Jones, J., concurring).
191. Members First Fed. Credit Union v. Members 1st Fed. Credit Union, 54 F. Supp. 2d 393, 402
(M.D. Pa. 1999) (“If [plaintiffs] can demonstrate a likelihood of confusion . . . it seems anomalous to
preclude it from obtaining injunctive relief simply because of the geographic distance between its branch
offices and those of [defendants].”).
192. Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27, 47 (2d Cir. 2016).
193. Id. at 31.
194. Id. at 33–36.
195. Id. at 36.
196. Id. at 36–37.
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in one geographic territory need not show the same probability of harm in
every further area into which the injunction might extend.197 Instead, the
senior user “must show evidence of plausibly foreseeable confusion beyond
its main area of injury.” 198 This analysis will turn on a case’s “particular
facts,” but the court in Guthrie found that the plaintiff had met this burden.
Thus, once a plaintiff has demonstrated likelihood of confusion in one area,
the Second Circuit will not require a showing of likelihood of confusion for
all other areas. The injunction will be denied only if the junior user can
affirmatively show that there is no likelihood of confusion in a particular
area.199 In one respect, this case simply sets up a presumption of confusion
in all areas where the senior user operates if the senior has shown a likelihood
of confusion in one area. Moreover, this case can be read to mean that an
injunction can be issued wherever the senior can demonstrate some
“plausibly foreseeable confusion.” Understood this way, the rigidity of
Dawn Donut would be bent to the breaking point.
Although these courts are all correct to weaken or reject Dawn Donut,
it is crucial that the holdings do not become too detached from consumer
confusion. For example, the court in Guthrie concluded that when a senior
user shows likelihood of confusion in territory A, she need not undergo the
same in-depth confusion analysis for territory B to get an injunction.200 The
facts of Guthrie undoubtedly helped shape this rule, for the senior user had
an actual presence in territory B as well as A in the case. Yet, in cases like
CarMax, the court seemed to indicate that an injunction can follow from a
demonstration of likelihood of confusion in the abstract, and confusion did
not need to be shown in a particular area. 201 However, likelihood of
confusion must remain critical to the territory analysis. If a senior user has
demonstrated a likelihood of confusion in territory A but has no presence in
territory B, then the burden must remain on the senior user to demonstrate a
likelihood of confusion in territory B before she can receive an injunction.202
The purpose of this paper is not to eliminate concurrent use. After all, there
is evidence that the number of good trademarks is limited—and we are

197. Id. at 47.
198. Id. at 49.
199. See id. at 46.
200. Id. at 47–48.
201. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1999).
202. As an example, the Southern District of New York has used Dawn Donut in its infringement
analysis regarding marketing channels. See Habitat Design Holdings, Ltd. v. Habitat Am. Holdings, Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 327, 332–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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running out.203 The choice between adopting Dawn Donut and granting mark
holders nationwide injunctive rights is not binary. Trademark rights, and the
subsequent right to enjoin others, must always be grounded in avoiding
consumer confusion.
At first glance, it may seem overly burdensome to require a senior user
to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in every area where the junior user
makes use of the mark. However, this is not as arduous as it may appear.
After all, most of the likelihood of confusion factors will not need to be
repeated for each location. For example, similarity of the marks, defendant’s
intent, consumer sophistication, and strength of the mark can all be done
once. Only actual confusion, likelihood of bridging the gap, and
advertising/marketing channels will need to be repeated for different regions.
But, under the old territoriality regime, this must be done as well. At common
law, courts would need to conduct a remoteness analysis for every area at
issue. Thus, the territory-infringement synthesis would be no additional work
for common law marks.
To be sure, the CarMax and Guthrie approach would be less work for
courts than the synthesis, since injunctions could be issued everywhere after
a finding of confusion in the abstract. Nevertheless, simple does not always
mean better. One must remember that overprotection of intellectual property
is just as harmful to the consumer as under-protection.204 To serve the goals
of trademark law, and prevent overprotection of trademark rights, courts
must look at likelihood of confusion in each area of potential confusion, and
enjoin use on that basis.
V. CONCLUSION
It was once unlikely that a consumer in New York would see a
trademark being used in Seattle. However, the Internet and mass travel have
pushed those days far behind us. Nevertheless, trademark law has yet to catch
up with changing times. Both common law trademarks and federally
registered trademarks suffer from pitfalls in the doctrine of territoriality, and
thus both are due for some updating. But the law does not need a massive
overhaul because the likelihood of confusion test provides all the necessary
tools to combat the issues plaguing territoriality. The solution is incredibly
simple: forget the stand-alone tests for territoriality and apply a likelihood of

203. See generally Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An
Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 947–48 (2018).
204. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (“Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.”).
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confusion analysis. If consumers in area A are likely to confuse marks P and
Q, then only permit the senior user to use the mark in area A. There does not
need to be a separate inquiry into the geographic distance between P and Q;
this is but one factor among many in the infringement analysis. The
incorporation of territoriality into the infringement test will both add analytic
clarity and protect an entire swath of consumers from possible confusion.
Thus, while trademark law is currently confused, it need only embrace
confusion to sort itself out.

